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The Effect of Pension Accounting on Corporate Pension Asset Allocation 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the impact of new pension disclosures and subsequent full pension recognition 
under FRS 17 and IAS 19 in the UK and SFAS 158 in the US on pension asset allocation. 
These standards require recognition of the total pension surplus/deficit on the balance sheet 
and periodical actuarial gains/losses in shareholders' equity. Therefore, these standards 
introduce a large element of volatility into company balance sheets and comprehensive 
income. 
 
We identify a Disclosure period during which UK companies had to disclose all the required 
data under FRS 17 in the notes without formal recognition. We also identify a Full 
Recognition period starting one year prior to until one year subsequent to the adoption of 
FRS 17/IAS 19 (UK) and SFAS 158 (US). We predict a shift of pension assets from equity to 
debt securities by UK companies during the Disclosure period due to the higher visibility of 
pensions in the UK and the anticipation of full recognition. We also predict a decline in 
pension funds allocated to equity securities during the Full Recognition period, around the 
adoption of FRS 17/IAS 19 and SFAS 158. 
 
We find that UK companies, on average, shifted pension assets from equity to debt securities 
during both the Disclosure and the Full Recognition periods. We also find that while prior to 
the adoption of SFAS 158 US companies maintained a stable allocation to equities and 
bonds, these companies, on average, shifted funds from equities to bonds around the 
adoption of SFAS 158. Cross-sectional analysis shows that the shift away from equities is 
related to changes in funding levels, shorter investment horizons, increased financial 
leverage and the expected impact of the new standards on shareholders' equity. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Defined Benefit Plans, Pension Asset Allocation, Pension Surplus/ Deficit, FRS 
17, IAS 19, SFAS 158. 
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1. Introduction 
We investigate the effect of new pension disclosures and subsequent recognition 
requirements of pension surplus/deficit on the allocation of pension funds to equity and debt 
securities. In November 2000, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in the UK issued 
Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) No. 17, Retirement Benefits (ASB, 2000), which 
initially had to be adopted in June 2003. In 2002, ASB extended the transitional period of 
FRS 17 to fiscal years starting on or after January 2005, which coincided with the adoption 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe. Effectively, UK companies 
had to adopt the revised International Accounting Standard (IAS) No. 19 (IASB, 2004), 
which was virtually identical to FRS 17. In September 2006, the Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB) issued SFAS 158 (FASB, 2006), which replaced SFAS 87 (FASB, 
1985) and became effective for all US companies in December 2006. 
Between fiscal 2000 and the adoption of FRS 17/IAS 19, UK companies had to provide 
new and detailed disclosure on the status of their pension plans. Adoption of FRS 17/IAS 19 
implies that UK companies recognize the total pension surplus/deficit on the balance sheet 
(net of deferred tax). Any resulting actuarial gains or losses arising during the year are 
recognized immediately in shareholders’ equity. Similarly, SFAS 158 requires full 
recognition of the pension surplus/deficit on the balance sheet and immediate recognition of 
all actuarial gains/losses and prior service cost through other comprehensive income. 
The recognition of net pension surplus/deficit as an asset/liability on the balance sheet 
and actuarial gains/losses in shareholders’ equity under FRS 17/IAS 19 and SFAS 158 
introduce material volatility to balance sheets of UK and US companies, especially if 
pension assets are mostly invested in equity securities. In particular, reporting actual, rather 
than smoothed, pension returns injects volatility into shareholders’ equity while the 
recognized net pension asset/liability could be a significant portion of a company’s book 
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value and market capitalization.1 
A cost-effective way of reducing the volatility of the pension deficit/surplus and the 
volatility of comprehensive income and shareholders’ equity is matching pension assets with 
pension liabilities. This could be achieved by selecting a portfolio of pension assets whose 
fair value is more positively correlated with the fair value of the pension liability, namely 
bonds.2 Alternatively, companies could react to the new accounting rules by terminating 
pension plans (Klumpes and Whittington, 2003) or by converting defined benefit pension 
plans into defined contribution and cash balance plans (D’Souza et al., 2004; Swinkels, 
2006). However, these actions may be costly due to tax and labor negotiation costs. 
We examine the impact of new pension disclosures and full pension recognition on asset 
allocation of UK and US companies. In particular, we examine changes in UK companies’ 
pension asset allocation before and after the adoption of FRS 17/IAS 19 (2000-2007). We 
identify two distinct accounting regimes for UK companies: A Disclosure period ranging 
from fiscal 2001 until one year prior to the adoption of FRS 17/IAS 19, and a Full 
Recognition regime, starting from one year prior to adoption until one year after the adoption 
of FRS 17/IAS 19. We predict that UK companies that sponsor defined benefit pension plans 
will shift pension assets from equity to debt securities during the Disclosure period. This is 
because of the increased visibility of pension plans due to market-based disclosures and the 
anticipation of the effect of full pension recognition on the volatility of shareholders’ equity 
and comprehensive income. We also predict a decline in pension assets allocated to equity 
securities during the Full Recognition period due to the recognition of pension surplus/deficit 
on the balance sheet and the higher anticipated volatility of shareholders’ equity and 
                                                 
1 The volatility that can be introduced into corporate balance sheets is evidenced by the fact that at the end of 
2001 the combined surplus for the FTSE 100 was £5 billion, but by mid July 2002 with the collapse in world 
stock markets this fell to a deficit of £25 billion (Reynolds, 2002). 
2 A report by the Committee on Investment of Employee Benefit Assets has estimated that switching to mark-
to-market pension accounting would result in approximately $290bn in funds being shifted from equities to 
bonds (Brewsterin, 2005). 
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comprehensive income. We also examine whether full recognition pension accounting under 
SFAS 158 prompted US companies to shift pension assets from equities to bonds. As US 
companies had to adopt Full Recognition accounting under SFAS 158 in 2006, we predict a 
decline in the allocation to equity securities by US companies from one year prior to the 
adoption of SFAS 158 (fiscal 2005) until one year after the adoption of the standard (fiscal 
2007). 
The new pension accounting standards in the UK and the US may not be the only reason 
for the change in the composition of pension assets. Contemporaneous changes in funding 
levels due to imposed minimum funding requirements, shorter investment horizons, changes 
in plan coverage and increased financial leverage could trigger similar asset allocation 
changes. Multivariate cross-sectional analysis reveals that while other factors have 
significant effects on pension asset allocation, the expected impact of the new standards is 
incrementally informative in explaining the shift to debt securities in UK and US companies; 
that is, the shift to debt securities is more significant in companies with larger pension 
schemes relative to shareholders' equity. 
To test our hypotheses, we use pension asset allocation data for large UK and US 
companies over the period 2000-2007. Using a sample of 1,509 and 2,128 firm-year 
observations for UK and US companies, respectively, we find that during the FRS 17 
Disclosure period, UK companies, on average, shifted funds from equity to debt securities. 
We also find that both UK and US companies shifted pension assets from equities to bonds 
during the Full Recognition period of FRS 17/IAS 19 and SFAS 158, respectively. This shift 
reduces the effect of the new standards on the volatility of shareholders’ equity and 
comprehensive income. In addition, cross sectional tests show that UK and US companies 
for which the negative impact of full recognition was expected to be stronger shifted 
relatively more funds from equity to debt securities. Collectively, the results support the 
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argument that new pension accounting standards in the UK and the US had a significant 
impact on corporate pension asset allocation, incrementally to other economic factors. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. It examines the determinants of 
pension asset allocation in an international setting using both UK and US companies. In 
addition, it is conducted during a period of a pension accounting change in both the UK and 
the US, which is a powerful setting for our study. Furthermore, the empirical evidence in this 
study is important in understanding the possible effects of full recognition pension 
accounting on capital markets. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the research design. Sample selection and 
descriptive statistics are included in Section 4. Section 5 provides the empirical results while 
Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Hypotheses  
Following the issuance of FRS 17 in 2000, UK companies were required to disclose the 
present value of the pension obligation and the market value of pension plan assets, as well 
as actuarial assumptions and details on asset allocation. These new disclosures meant greater 
transparency of the pension scheme as well as increasing investor scrutiny of the impact of 
pension schemes on financial statements. While FRS 17 disclosures provide comfort to 
investors in over-funded plans, under-funded companies are perceived as riskier because 
pension deficits are a form of debt.3 Also, the existence of Minimum Funding Requirements 
increases the likelihood of additional pension contributions, especially in under-funded 
plans. Higher future pension contributions and the uncertainty associated with their timing 
and magnitude also increases the perceived risk of sponsoring companies. Furthermore, 
                                                 
3 See Harris et al. (2001) for a discussion of the effects of FRS 17 on financial statements and valuation. 
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under FRS 17, employees have access to more accurate pension disclosures, which could 
trigger pressure to reduce plan risk, as the employees bear the deficit, while the company 
enjoys the surplus. 
Thus, new pension disclosure requirements are potentially costly and companies would 
prefer to hedge themselves against potential pension deficits by reducing the volatility of the 
pension surplus/deficit and improving the matching of pension assets and liabilities (Blake, 
2001). Better matching is achieved by allocating more pension assets to debt (i.e., bonds and 
other interest bearing securities) instead of equity securities. As the market value of bonds is 
generally less volatile than that of equities, and since pension liabilities largely depend on 
prevailing yield on bonds, such a policy would result in lower volatility of the pension 
deficit/surplus. In addition, a shift from equities to bonds is likely to be exacerbated by the 
anticipated adoption of FRS 17 and the recognition of the full pension liability on subsequent 
balance sheets. In contrast, shifting pension assets to bonds is likely to result in higher future 
pension contributions, as the expected rate of return on bonds is lower than that on equities. 
Thus, the shift from equity to debt securities will continue as long as the cost of reporting a 
pension deficit is higher than the present value of additional future contributions. This leads 
to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: UK companies that sponsor defined benefit pension plans will shift pension 
assets from equity to debt securities during the FRS 17 Disclosure period. 
 
Adoption of FRS 17/IAS 19 in the UK and SFAS 158 in the US meant recognition of the 
entire pension deficit/surplus on the balance sheet, recognition of all prior service costs in 
net income and recognition of all actuarial gains/losses in comprehensive income. Therefore, 
in addition to increasing, on average, the amount of debt on the balance sheet, adoption of 
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the new standards in both countries is expected to increase the volatility of shareholders’ 
equity and comprehensive income. 
Adoption of full pension recognition could have significant contractual implications. 
First, as many contracts are based on verifiable balance sheet figures, higher recognized debt 
on the balance sheet increases the likelihood of violating existing debt covenants, hence the 
cost of debt renegotiation. Second, higher volatility of shareholders’ equity increases the 
probability of violating equity-based debt covenant because the balance sheet is now 
exposed to market volatility through interest rate changes and changes in market values of 
equities. Third, as the pension deficit is recognized against the company’s distribution 
reserves, adoption of the new standards may decrease distributable reserves and may have a 
negative effect on the company’s ability to pay dividends or to maintain a stable stream of 
dividends. Adoption could also have a negative effect on stakeholders’ ability to evaluate 
management performance. For example, Return on Equity (ROE), a widely used 
management performance measure, may be distorted as shareholders' equity becomes more 
volatile. If stakeholders consider comprehensive income in the numerator of ROE, then the 
volatility of ROE is even higher. In addition, higher volatility of shareholders’ equity and 
comprehensive income could create a perception of weaker management control. To mitigate 
the effect of adoption on existing contracts and to facilitate better performance evaluation, 
we expect companies to shift pension assets from equity to debt securities during the 
adoption of full pension recognition. This argument leads to our second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: UK and US companies that sponsor defined benefit pension plans will shift 
pension assets from equity to debt securities during the Full Recognition period (adoption of 
FRS 17/IAS 19 in the UK and SFAS 158 in the US). 
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The impact of the new pension standards is expected to be more (less) significant in 
companies with relatively larger (smaller) pension plans. For example, in its 2003 annual 
report, Charter Plc, a UK-based engineering company, reported pension assets with a market 
value of £462.2 million, while its shareholders’ equity amounted to £24.9 million. This 
means that a decline of 5.4% in the market value of pension assets could eliminate the 
company's entire shareholders’ equity restricting its dividend payout ability. Similarly, a 
decline in the yield on the AA-rated corporate bonds could eliminate shareholders’ equity, as 
the pension obligation increases when the discount rate declines. Thus, we expect companies 
with larger pension schemes relative to shareholders equity to shift more assets from equity 
to debt securities during the Disclosure and Full Recognition periods.4 
Companies with larger pension schemes also experience larger actuarial gains/losses, 
especially if a majority of pension assets are invested in equity securities. These companies 
are more sensitive to the volatility effects of the new standards and would therefore have 
stronger motivation to shift pension assets from equity to debt securities. In contrast, 
companies with smaller actuarial gains/losses would have a weaker motivation to switch 
pension funds to debt securities, since shifting to less risky assets also implies a lower 
expected return on pension assets on the income statement (Fernandez, 2002). Consequently, 
we hypothesize that the shift from equity to debt securities will be more significant for 
companies with a larger ratio of pension assets/liabilities to shareholders’ equity. We expect 
this relation for UK companies during both the Disclosure and Full Recognition periods and 
for US companies during the Full Recognition period. 
 
 
                                                 
4 In 2001, Boots plc. liquidated all of its equity holdings in its £2.3 billion pension fund and moved the 
proceeds into long-dated bonds (Ralfe, 2002; McLeish, 2001). Similarly, General Motors reduced the share of 
equities in the pension portfolio from 47% in 12/2005 to 38% in 12/2006 and to 26% in 12/2007.  
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Hypothesis 3a: The shift of pension assets from equity to debt securities by UK companies 
during the Disclosure period is positively correlated with the relative size of the pension 
scheme.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: The shift of pension assets from equity to debt securities by UK and US 
companies during the Full Recognition period is positively correlated with the relative size 
of the pension scheme. 
 
While this study highlights the asset allocation effects of new pension accounting 
standards, other factors may have material allocational effects during the Disclosure period 
in the UK and the Full Recognition period in the UK and the US. Prior literature identifies 
three major factors that affect pension asset allocation: Funding levels, investment horizon 
and offsetting firm risk.5 
Both UK and US companies are subject to Minimum Funding Requirements (MFR). For 
example, in August 2006, the Pension Reform Act was signed into law in the United States. 
This Act requires defined benefit pension plans to attain full funding status within seven 
years by contributing funds to the plans. These requirements are expected to increase 
funding levels over time. Prior literature is rather mixed as to the effect of funding levels on 
asset allocation. Still, Harrison and Sharpe (1983) suggest that as pension plans become less 
underfunded, the allocation to equities should decline. Thus, increasing funding levels could 
trigger a decline in the allocation to equities independent of new accounting standards. 
Investment maturity could also have a significant effect on asset allocation. As pension plans 
become more mature, the investment horizon is shortened, which is expected to trigger a 
shift of pension assets from equities to bonds. Finally, prior studies documented a negative 
                                                 
5 Black (1980), Feldstein and Seligman (1981), Tepper (1981) and Harrison and Sharpe (1983), among others. 
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relation between firm risk and the allocation to equities, as companies offset firm risk by 
using a more conservative pension asset allocation policy. Therefore, a change in pension 
asset allocation could be associated with changes in firm risk and not necessarily related to 
new accounting standards. Although our main empirical focus is on the impact of the new 
accounting standards, we do control for these alternative ‘economic’ explanations in our 
empirical tests. 
 
3. Empirical Design 
Pension assets are classified in the notes to the financial statements into three main 
categories: ‘stocks’, ‘bonds’, and ‘other’. Stocks and bonds together account for about 90% 
of total pension funds in our UK and US samples. ‘Other’ often includes assets such as 
mortgage-backed securities, venture capital, private placement, properties, etc. 
To test hypotheses 1 and 2, we analyze pension asset composition over the period 2000-
2007 for a sample of UK and US companies. Specifically, we test whether UK companies 
have shifted pension funds from equities to bonds during the Disclosure period and the Full 
Recognition period, and whether US companies shifted funds from equities to bonds during 
the Full Recognition periods. We also examine whether funding levels, investment horizon 
and firm risk changed systematically over the sample period.  
To test hypotheses 3a and 3b, we construct a model that explains the cross-sectional 
variation in the percentage of pension funds allocated to equity securities (rEQUITYit):  
 
itititititit
itititititit
CLOSESIZESDCFTAXRDIVP
LEVHORFUNDFUNDIMPACTrEQUITY
εβββββ
ββββββ
++++++
+++++=
109876
54
2
3210    (1) 
 
The dependent variable in Equation (1), rEQUITYit, is the market value of pension 
assets allocated to equity securities divided by the market value of total pension assets for 
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firm i in year t. The first independent variable in Equation (1) is IMPACTit, which measures 
the potential impact of the new accounting standards on company i in year t. As the impact 
relates primarily to the relative size of the pension plan, we use two simple measures of the 
size of the pension plan relative to shareholders' equity: 
(i) EXPOS1it: The fair value of pension assets deflated by book value of shareholders’ 
equity. This variable captures the company’s exposure to the volatility in the market 
value of pension assets and net pension surplus/deficit. 
(ii) EXPOS2it: The Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO) deflated by book value of 
shareholders’ equity. This variable captures the company’s exposure to the volatility in 
discount rates. 
To compute EXPOS1it and EXPOS2it, we use shareholders’ equity before the effect of 
actuarial gains/losses and the recognition of net pension surplus/deficit. 
Tax and regulatory factors play a significant role in asset allocation through funding 
levels. In general, the tax-deductibility of pension contributions should induce companies to 
pre-fund their pension plans; companies that are subject to higher tax rates should have even 
greater incentives to pre-fund their plans. Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) argue that since 
returns on pension assets are not taxed, these assets should be invested in the most heavily 
taxed securities, presumably bonds. Their argument suggests no association between funding 
levels and asset allocation as all companies invest in bonds regardless of funding levels. In 
contrast, Harrison and Sharpe (1983) argue that the existence of the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) provides US companies with a put option on extremely 
under-funded pension obligation. Together with limited tax deductibility in the case of 
extremely over-funded plans, they argue that funding and asset-allocation decisions are joint 
and extreme. To maximize tax benefits on one hand and the value of the PBGC option on the 
other hand, companies should either over-fund the pension plan and allocate all the assets to 
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bonds, or under-fund and allocate all the assets to equities. Although in practice 
funding/asset-allocation decisions are rarely extreme, this argument supports a negative 
relation between funding levels and allocations to equities. A serious caveat is that the value 
of the PBGC put option in the US has declined over time and in particular since the 1986 
Tax Reform Act. Also, an insurance company such as the PBGC did not exist in the UK 
until 2006. Therefore, the incentive to allocate pension assets to equities in cases of extreme 
under-funding may be of a second order nature. 
Bader (1991) argues that companies strive to minimize the volatility of future pension 
contributions. These contributions are fairly predictable for moderate funding levels, but less 
predictable for more extreme levels. To reduce the volatility of pension contributions, he 
argues that extremely over-funded and under-funded plans should invest in bonds, while 
only moderately funded plans should increase allocation to equities. His argument suggests 
an inverted U-shape relation between funding levels and the allocation to equities. 
Based on these arguments, we include both FUNDit and FUND2it to accommodate the 
possibility of a non-linear relation between funding levels and allocation to equities.6 The 
funding status is measured as the fair value of pension assets divided by the accumulated 
benefit obligation (ABO).7 
Investment horizon plays a significant role in pension asset allocation. While pension 
obligations to retirees are relatively short-term and are primarily affected by interest rates, 
obligations to active employees are relatively long-term and are primarily affected by salary 
increases. As bonds are more correlated with interest rate changes and stocks are more 
highly correlated with salary increases, companies with relatively young (mature) workforce 
should invest more in stocks (bonds). Consequently, we expect a positive correlation 
                                                 
6 Amir and Benartzi (1999) documented an inverted-U relation between funding status and the percentage 
invested in equities.  
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between investment horizon, HORit, and allocation to equities. HORit, is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of PBO to current service cost. Overall, an older (younger) 
workforce should lead to a smaller (larger) ratio of PBO to service cost, indicating a shorter 
(longer) investment horizon. 
Our horizon variable (HORit) may be subject to measurement error. To mitigate this 
problem, we include another variable that is associated with investment horizon. This 
variable, CLOSEit, takes into account recent trends to move away from defined benefit to 
defined contribution pension plans and close the defined benefit plans to new entrants 
(McSherry, 2006). Thus, we include in our model an indicator variable that is equal to one if 
the principal defined benefit plan is closed to new entrants, and zero otherwise. As the 
investment horizon of closed plans is, on average, shorter, we expect a negative relation 
between this variable and allocations to equities. 
Our model also includes variables that capture the influence of debt contracts and 
dividend payout policy. As the pension surplus/deficit is recognized on the balance sheet, the 
pension asste/liability and corresponding investment portfolio may be affected by certain 
contractual arrangements. In particular, companies that are closer to the violation of debt 
covenants have stronger motives to improve asset/liability matching in order to reduce 
recognized pension deficits. Better asset/liability matching would also reduce the volatility 
of shareholders' equity and future pension contributions, which in turn would reduce the 
volatility of dividends. We expect companies with tighter debt covenants and higher 
dividends payout ratios to allocate more to bonds. To capture these effects, we include 
financial leverage (LEVit) and dividends payout ratio (DIVPit). We expect the coefficients on 
these variables to be negatively associated with the amount invested in equity. Financial 
                                                                                                                                                      
7 Since ABO is not available for UK companies, we calculate ABO based on the formula proposed in Amir and 
Benartzi (1999): ABO = PBO / (1+G)N, where G is the assumed projected salary increase and N is pension 
fund’s investment horizon. 
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leverage (LEVit) is, measured as long term debt divided by the sum of long term debt and 
market value of equity for firm i in year t. Dividend payout ratio (DIVPit) is measured as 
dividends per share divided by retained earnings per share. If retained earnings are negative, 
then the variable is measured as the average dividends per share over the current and past 
two years divided by average retained earnings per share over the current and past two years. 
Companies subject to higher tax rates should have greater incentives to allocate more 
pension assets to bonds, as bonds are more heavily taxed. Therefore, we include the 
company's effective tax rate (TAXRit), measured as total tax expense divided by pre-tax 
income in year t. If current pre-tax income is negative, we use the average tax expense over 
the current and past two years divided by the average pre-tax income over the current and 
past two years. 
Friedman (1983) and Bodie et al. (1984) find that companies offset high corporate risk 
by investing more of the pension assets in bonds. This policy of offsetting risk through the 
pension fund may reflect management preference to avoid making contributions to the 
pension fund when operating cash flows are low.8 Consistent with these findings, we expect 
a negative correlation between the variability of operating cash flows and equity allocation. 
In addition, companies with more diversified operations would prefer to assume more risk in 
their pension fund. To the extent that larger firms are more diversified, we would expect a 
positive association between firm size and allocation to equities. The volatility of operating 
cash flows (SDCFit) is measured as the standard deviation of operating cash flows over the 
current and past four years, deflated by book value of common equity. Firm size (SIZEit) is 
measured as the natural logarithm of market value of equity. 
To directly test our hypotheses, we define two dependent variables: The first one 
                                                 
8 Specifically, if operating cash flows are volatile and the pension assets are invested in equities, the plan is 
likely to become under-funded when operating cash flows are low. As a result, the company would have to 
make large contributions to the pension fund in times of low operating cash flows. 
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computes the change in the percentage of assets allocated to equities during the Disclosure 
period of UK companies. The Disclosure period is defined as the period between fiscal 2001 
and the year before the adoption of FRS 17/IAS 19: 
rDISCLOSE = rEQUITY (year 2001) - rEQUITY (Pre-Adoption year).9 
The second dependent variable computes the change in percentage of assets allocated to 
equities during the Full Recognition period. For UK (US) companies, this period begins one 
year prior to adoption of FRS 17/IAS 19 (SFAS 158) and ends one year subsequent to 
adoption: 
rADOPT = rEQUITY (Pre-Adoption year) - rEQUITY (Post-Adoption year). 
We estimate Equation (2) for UK companies only. The independent variables are 
measured as the difference between the level of the variable at the beginning of the 
Disclosure period and its level at the end of the period. 
 
itiiiiii
iiiii
CLOSESIZESDCFTAXRDIVPLEV
HORFUNDFUNDIMPACTrDISCLOSE
εββββββ
βββββ
+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+
Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+=
1098765
4
2
3210   (2) 
 
In addition, we estimate Equation (3) for both UK and US companies around the Full 
Recognition period. To control for long-term asset allocation trends, we added to Equation 
(3) another control variable, rDISCLOSE, which captures asset allocation changes prior to 
adoption. Controlling for prior allocational effects could allow us to draw more accurate 
inferences on the incremental effect of accounting standards on pension asset allocation. 
 
                                                 
9 Technically, the Disclosure period begins in year 2000. However, we use 2001 as the starting year because 
many observations for year 2000 are missing. 
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The independent variables in Equation (3) are measured as the difference between the level 
of the variable before and after adoption. 
We use ordinary least square (OLS) to estimate the above equations. Petersen (2008) 
argues that residuals may be correlated across firms or across time in panel data and 
therefore OLS standard errors may be biased. In this study, it is possible that the unspecified 
determinants of the dependent variables are correlated both over time and across firms. For 
example, if the equity market as a whole is volatile, then all firms may shift away from 
volatile equities to less volatile bonds. On the other hand, the strategy of pension asset 
allocation could also be driven by some unspecified firm-specific factors, which will give 
rise to a firm effect in the error terms. The presence of positive correlation among error 
terms results in underestimated standard errors and thus inflated t-statistics. To address such 
econometric concern, we employ two-dimension clustering suggested by Petersen (2008) to 
accommodate the possibility of both time effect and firm effect in such panel data. 
 
4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
The initial UK sample contains 250 companies that belong to the FTSE 350 list and 
that sponsor defined benefit pension plans during 2000-2007. We deleted from the UK 
sample seven companies that elected the “corridor” method allowed under IAS 19. 
Information on market value of pension assets, actuarial present value of pension liabilities, 
pension actuarial assumptions, actuarial gains/losses and details of pension asset allocation 
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are collected from annual financial statements. All other financial data for UK companies are 
from Datastream. 
Data for US companies' pension asset allocation until 2004 are collected from Pensions 
and Investments, a periodical survey that covers the largest 1,000 pension funds in the US. 
Of this 1,000, approximately 300 pension funds relate to defined benefit plans for publicly 
traded firms (the remainder are sponsored by private firms, unions, or government entities, 
or are foreign companies listed in the US). Asset allocation data for 2005-2007 are collected 
from notes to the annual financial statements. Financial data for US companies are from 
Compustat. After removing observations with missing data, the sample consists of 4,440 
firm-year observations, of which 1,509 observations are for UK companies and 2,128 
observations are for US companies. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the UK and US sub-samples. Over the entire 
sample period, both UK and US companies allocate, on average, 62% of their pension assets 
to equities. The size of the pension plan relative to shareholders' equity is larger in UK than 
in US firms, as reflected by higher means and medians of EXPOS1 and EXPOS2 (statistical 
tests not reported). This difference could lead to more significant allocational effects in the 
UK than in the US. As for other variables, the UK and US sub-samples are similar to each 
other in terms of funding status (FUND), pension horizon (HOR) and effective tax rates 
(TAXR). US companies are less risky as reflected by lower volatility of cash flows (SDCF) 
and larger firm size (SIZE). US companies also have lower dividend payout ratios, for the 
median firm, and are more highly leveraged than UK companies.10 
(Table 1 about here) 
Most UK companies adopted IAS 19 in 2005, the mandatory year of adoption. 
However, 54 UK companies in our sample adopted FRS 17 prior to the mandatory year. 
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Prior literature suggests that the timing of adoption of new accounting studies is largely 
affected by the impact of the new standard on the financial statements and by contracting 
costs (e.g., Amir and Ziv, 1997). Using logistic regressions to identify the characteristics of 
UK companies that elected early adoption of FRS 17, we find (results not tabulated) that 
early adopters have, on average, smaller (at the 0.05 level) ratios of pension assets to 
shareholders' equity (EXPOS1). In addition, we find that early adopters have longer (at the 
0.05 level) investment horizons (HOR). All other variables that were examined (rEQUITY, 
FUND, LEV, SIZE, CLOSE) were not significant (at the 0.10 level) in explaining the 
adoption decision. These results are consistent with the claim that UK companies that were 
less affected by FRS 17 were more likely to adopt the standard earlier. 
Table 2 provides data on the composition of pension assets for UK companies (top 
panel), a sub-sample of 54 UK early adopters of FRS 17 (middle panel) and US companies 
(bottom panel) over 2000-2007. UK companies gradually decreased their average allocation 
to equities by 19.8% and increased their allocation to bonds by 12.7%. UK early adopters of 
FRS 17 exhibit a similar pattern until 2003; however, the decline in the allocation to equities 
is sharper in 2004. During 2000-2005, US companies had a relatively stable allocation to 
equities and bonds, however, we observe a decline in the allocation to equities in the period 
2005-2007.11 
(Table 2 about here) 
Figure 1 depicts the mean percentage of pension assets allocated to equity and debt 
securities for UK and US companies (Figure 1a) and for UK early adopters of FRS 17 
(Figure 1b). Figure 1a shows a gradual decrease (increase) in the allocation to equities 
                                                                                                                                                      
10 All continuous explanatory variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of extreme 
observations, except TAXRit and DIVPit which are winsorized at 5% and 95% to remove negative values. 
11 We also examined changes in asset allocation using market values of stocks and bond that existed in 2000. 
This way, we attempt to remove the effects of market value changes on the composition of pension assets and 
isolate the effect of corporate rebalancing. The decline in the allocation to stocks and the increase in the 
allocation to bonds are more transparent in both sub-samples.  
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(bonds) in UK companies during the sample period. The average allocation in US 
companies, on the other hand, is not as monotonic. Until 2003, US companies maintained a 
relatively stable allocation to equities. Between 2003 and 2005, average allocation to equities 
increased due to higher stock prices. From 2005 to 2007 we observe a significant decrease in 
the allocation to equity in US companies. 
Figure 1b, which focuses on early adopters of FRS 17, shows a gradual decrease 
(increase) in the allocation to equities (bonds). However, we observe a sharp decline in the 
allocation to equities in 2001, the year FRS 17 was released. Overall, early adopters exhibit a 
more conservative asset allocation relative to other UK companies. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Figure 2 depicts the trend of pension asset allocation around the adoption of FRS 17/ 
IAS 19 in the UK (Figure 2a), SFAS 158 in the US (Figure 2b) and early adopters of FRS 17 
(Figure 2c). For each company, we identify the adoption year and denote it as AY(0). Then, 
we plot mean percentage of pension assets allocated to equities and bonds around the 
adoption year. Figure 2a presents information for the entire UK sample between AY(-3) and 
AY(+2). The figure exhibits a decline in pension funds invested in equities, and an upward 
trend in the percentage invested in bonds. These changes are more transparent in years 
AY(+1) and AY(+2), consistent with our argument that the new accounting standard caused 
UK companies to transfer pension assets from equities to bonds. 
Figure 2b presents information for US companies between AY(-3) and AY(+1).12 The 
figure also exhibits a decline in pension funds invested in equities and an upward trend in the 
percentage invested in bonds subsequent to adoption of SFAS 158. However, these changes 
are not as sharp as in the UK. Figure 2c present movements in asset allocation for UK early 
                                                 
12 AY(+2) is fiscal 2008 and thus unavailable at this time. 
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adopters. As in Figure 2a, we observe sharp declines in the allocation to equities around the 
adoption of the new standard.  
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 3, Panel A, provides results for testing whether UK companies changed their 
pension asset allocation during the Disclosure period of FRS 17 (Hypothesis 1). The results 
show that UK companies increased (decreased) their allocation to bonds (equities) during the 
Disclosure period (at the 0.01 level). In particular, average allocation to bonds increased by 
5.4% (significant at the 0.01 level) while average allocation to equities decreased by 4.3% 
(significant at the 0.01 level). A similar pattern is observed for early adopters of FRS 17. 
These companies increased the allocation to bonds by 3.4% (significant at the 0.02 level) and 
decreased the allocation to equities by 3.6% (significant at the 0.02 level). 
For comparison, we measured the changes in asset allocation in US companies prior to 
the adoption of SFAS 158. We find that US companies decreased the allocation to bonds by 
3% and increased the allocation to equities by 5% (these changes are significant at the 0.01 
level). The results in Table 3, Panel A, support Hypothesis 1 – UK companies decreased 
their exposure to equities during the disclosure period of FRS 17. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents results for testing whether UK and US companies changed 
their pension asset allocation during the adoption of full pension recognition under IAS 19/ 
FRS 17 in the UK and SFAS 158 in the US (Hypothesis 2). The test statistic is constructed as 
the difference between %Equity (and %Bond) in the pre-adoption and the post-adoption year 
(-1, +1). 
On average, UK companies increased their allocation to bonds by 3.7% and decreased 
the allocation to equities by 4.6% around the adoption of Full Recognition under FRS 17 / 
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IAS 19 (both changes are significant at the 0.01 level). The change in asset allocation is more 
extreme in early adopters of FRS 17. This sub-sample of companies increased the allocation 
to bonds by 4.8% and decreased the allocation to equities by 6.6% (both changes are 
significant at the 0.01 level). A change in asset allocation is also observed in US companies 
around the adoption of SFAS 158. In particular, US companies increased the average 
allocation to bonds by 2.5% and decreased the average allocation to equities by 3.9% (both 
changes are significant at the 0.01 level). 
The results in Panel B of Table 3 support Hypothesis 2. In particular, the evidence 
suggests that both UK and US companies modified their pension asset allocation policies by 
shifting pension assets from equity to debt securities. In addition, the magnitude of this shift 
is, on average, similar in both countries. This shift reduces the effects of full recognition 
accounting on the balance sheet and comprehensive income. 
(Table 3 about here) 
While the results in Table 3 support Hypotheses 1 and 2, there could be alternative 
explanations for the changes in pension asset composition. Prior literature suggests three 
alternative reasons for changes in pension asset composition: (i) higher funding levels, due to 
recent regulatory changes, caused companies to shift assets from equities to bonds; (ii) 
shorter investment horizons prompted companies to shift pension assets from equities to 
bonds; and (iii) increase in overall firm risk might have caused companies to shift assets 
from equities to bonds. 
To examine the potential effect of funding levels, investment horizon and firm risk on 
asset allocation, we examine the behaviour of these factors starting three years before 
adoption of full pension recognition until two year after adoption (one year after adoption for 
US companies). The results are presented in Table 4. 
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As Table 4 shows, average funding levels (FUND) have increased for both UK and US 
companies around the adoption of the new standards. These increases, which are significant 
at the 0.01 level, could explain the shift from equities to bonds in UK and US companies. 
Investment horizons (HOR) increased around the adoption of the new standards in both 
countries (significant at the 0.01 level). However, an increase in investment horizon is 
inconsistent with a switch from equities to bonds; thus, changes in investment horizons are 
unlikely to be the cause for the shift in asset composition. We further examined the 
proportion of companies that closed their defined benefit plans to new entrants (CLOSE). 
Closing the fund to new entrants reduces the investment horizon over time and could trigger 
a shift from equities to bonds. As Table 4 shows, the proportion of closed plans increases in 
the UK (from 0.51 prior to adoption to 0.60 after adoption) and in the US (from 0.24 prior to 
adoption to 0.35 after adoption). These increases, which are significant at the 0.01 level, 
could explain the movement of pension assets from equities to bonds. As for firm risk, we 
find that mean leverage (LEV) decreased over time and mean firm size (SIZE) increased over 
time in both countries. The reduction in firm risk, as reflected in leverage and size, is 
inconsistent with the switch of pension assets from equities to bonds, thus cannot serve as a 
potential explanation for the shift of pension assets from equities to bonds. 
The middle panel of Table 4 presents mean variables for UK early adopters. We find 
that funding levels and firm risk remained relatively stable from three years before adoption 
until two years after adoption. Investment horizon increased from the year before adoption 
until the year after adoption (significant at the 0.09 level) and the proportion of closed plans 
increased from 0.36 to 0.42 around the adoption of FRS 17 (significant at the 0.08 level). 
Thus, the only alternative explanation to the switch of pension assets from equities to bonds 
in UK early adopters is the increase in the proportion of closed plans. 
(Table 4 about here) 
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So far, the results are consistent with the argument that the shift in pension assets in UK 
and US companies is, at least partially, driven by new accounting standards, although and 
the increase in the proportion of closed funds and increases in funding levels could also 
explain the shift from equities to bonds. We now turn to cross-sectional analysis in order to 
examine these effects in a multivariate setting. 
First, we estimate equation 2, in which the dependent variable is the change in the 
allocation to equities during the Disclosure period (rDISCLOSE) prior to the adoption of 
FRS 17/IAS 19. As Table 5 shows, the coefficients on the impact variables (EXPOS1 and 
EXPOS2) are positive, as expected, and significant at the 0.05 level. This result, which 
supports Hypothesis 3a, suggests that UK companies with larger pension schemes relative to 
shareholders' equity shift more funds from equities to bonds. 
The evidence in Table 5 also highlights the role of other factors in explaining changes in 
asset allocation during the Disclosure period. Specifically, UK companies that experienced 
an increase in funding levels over the Disclosure period shifted more assets from equities to 
bonds, as reflected by positive (significant at the 0.10 level) coefficients on ΔFUND. In 
addition, companies that experienced an increase in the investment horizon shifted less 
assets from equity to debt securities, as reflected by the negative coefficients on ΔHOR 
(significant at the 0.05 level). We also find that companies that experienced an increase in 
effective tax rates (ΔTAX) shifted more pension assets to bonds, as expected. Furthermore, 
companies with higher financial leverage (ΔLEV) shifted more assets to bonds, probably to 
mitigate the effect of subsequent recognition on the volatility of shareholders' equity. 
Finally, companies that closed their pension plans to new entrants during the Disclosure 
period shifted more assets from equities to bonds, as reflected by the positive coefficients on 
ΔCLOSE (significant at the 0.01 level). 
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The results in Table 5 suggest that during the Disclosure period, UK companies shifted 
pension assets from equities to bonds because of changes in funding levels, investment 
horizons, effective tax rates, financial leverage and plan scope. Among these variables, the 
variable that had the most significant effect on asset allocation is ΔCLOSE. In particular, 
companies that closed their pension plans to new entrants shifted more funds from equities to 
bonds. However, after controlling for these effects, we find that UK companies with larger 
pension plans relative to shareholders' equity shifted more pension assets from equity to debt 
securities during the FRS 17 Disclosure period. We attribute these findings, which support 
Hypothesis 3a, to the new disclosure requirements of FRS 17. In particular, these new 
pension disclosures prompted companies with larger pension plans relative to shareholders' 
equity to reduce the volatility of more visible and transparent pension deficits. 
(Table 5 about here) 
To test Hypothesis 3b, we estimate equations (3), which explains the change in the 
allocation to equity securities during the Full Recognition period of FRS 17/IAS 19 in the 
UK and SFAS 158 in the US. Table 6 reports results for the UK sample on the left panel and 
for the US sample on the right panel. 
Starting with the UK sample, the coefficients on the main test variables, ΔEXPOS1 and 
ΔEXPOS2, are positive, as expected, and significant at the 0.05 level. This result, which 
supports Hypothesis 3b, suggests that UK companies with larger pension plans relative to 
shareholders' equity shifted more assets from equity to debt securities around the adoption of 
FRS 17/IAS 19. 
In addition, the coefficients on ΔFUND are negative (significant at the 0.05 level). This 
result suggests that UK companies that experienced an increase in funding levels shifted less 
pension assets from equities to bonds. Also, the coefficients on ΔTAXR are positive 
(significant at the 0.01 level), as expected, suggesting that companies with higher effective 
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tax rates shifted more funds to bonds. Furthermore, the coefficients on ΔLEV are positive 
(significant at the 0.05 level), as expected, suggesting that companies with higher debt 
shifted more fund to bonds to reduce the effect of full recognition on the volatility of 
shareholders' equity. Finally, the coefficients on ΔCLOSE are positive, as expected, and 
significant at the 0.05 level, consistent with the argument that companies that closed their 
pension plans to new entrants during the adoption period shifted more funds from equities to 
bonds. Finally, the positive coefficients on rDISCLOSE suggest that companies that shifted 
more funds from equities to bonds prior to adoption continued to shift assets to bonds during 
the adoption period.  
Overall, these findings, which support Hypothesis 3b, are consistent with the claim that 
UK companies with larger pension plans relative to shareholders' equity shifted more 
pension assets from equity to debt securities during the FRS 17/IAS 19 Full Recognition 
period incrementally to changes in funding levels, effective tax rates, financial leverage and 
plan coverage.13 
Table 6 also presents results for estimating equations (3) using US data (right panel). 
The coefficients on the main test variables, EXPOS1 and EXPOS2, are positive and 
significant at the 0.10 level or better, which supports Hypothesis 3b. This result suggests 
that, similar to UK companies, US companies with larger pension plans relative to 
shareholders' equity shifted more assets from equity to debt securities during the SFAS 158 
Full Recognition period. 
The results also highlight the role of dividend payout, effective tax rates and financial 
leverage in asset allocation of US companies. In particular, companies that pay more 
                                                 
13 We also estimated equation (3) for UK early adopters (42 observations with complete data). We find (results 
not tabulated) positive coefficients on ΔEXPOS1 and ΔEXPOS2 (significant at the 0.10 level), as expected, 
suggesting that early adopters with larger pension plans relative to shareholders' equity shifted more funds from 
equities to bonds. We also find positive coefficients on ΔLEV (significant at the 0.10 level), suggesting that 
companies with larger financial leverage shifted more funds to bonds possibly to reduce the likelihood of 
violating debt-related covenants. 
 25
dividends shifted more funds to bonds to reduce the effect of the new standard on the 
stability of dividends. Also, as expected, companies with higher effective tax rates and larger 
financial debt shifted more funds to bonds. In contrast to our results for UK companies, the 
coefficients on ΔFUND, ΔCLOSE and rDISCLOSE are not significant in explaining the shift 
to bonds. Overall, our findings are consistent with the argument that US companies shifted 
pension assets from equities to bonds to reduce the impact of the new standard on the 
volatility of shareholders' equity, which in turn reduces the volatility of dividends and the 
likelihood of violating debt covenants. 
(Table 6 about here) 
 
6. Conclusions 
FRS 17 and the revised IAS 19 radically changed accounting and reporting of defined 
benefit plans in the UK by initially introducing new market-based pension disclosures and 
subsequently requiring full balance sheet recognition of the pension surplus/deficit. In 
December 2006, the FASB issued SFAS 158 replacing the partial recognition method of 
SFAS 87 with full balance sheet recognition of defined benefit post-retirement plans. To 
reduce the effect of capital market fluctuations on reported earnings, these standards require 
that actuarial gains/losses shall be recognized in comprehensive income. We investigate 
whether new market-based pension disclosures had any impact on pension asset allocation of 
UK companies. We also examine whether asset allocation of UK and US companies changed 
around the adoption of the new standards. 
We identify a Disclosure period during which UK companies had to disclose all the 
required data under FRS 17 in the notes to the financial statements without formally 
recognizing the full pension surplus/deficit on the balance sheet. In addition, we identify a 
Full Recognition period around the adoption of either FRS 17 or IAS 19 in the UK and SFAS 
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158 in the US. We hypothesize that there exists a shift from equity to debt securities by UK 
companies during the Disclosure period of FRS 17 due to the higher visibility of pensions in 
the UK and the anticipation of full recognition. We also predict a decline in pension funds 
allocated to equity securities during the Full Recognition period, around the adoption of FRS 
17/IAS 19 in the UK and SFAS 158 in the US. 
We find that during the FRS 17 Disclosure period UK companies reduced their pension 
fund exposure to equity securities and at the same time increased their allocation to debt 
securities. We also find that UK companies decreased their allocation to equities during the 
FRS 17/IAS 19 Full Recognition period. Similarly, US companies decreased their allocation 
to equities following the adoption of SFAS 158. Finally, cross-sectional analysis reveals that 
the shift from equity to debt securities is more pronounced in companies with relatively 
larger pension schemes. 
In our analysis, we also considered alternative explanations to the shift of pension funds 
from equities to bonds. We find that changes in funding levels that followed new minimum 
funding requirements are associated with a shift of pension assets from equities to bonds. In 
addition, many companies in the UK and the US have recently closed their defined benefit 
plans to new entrants. This modification in plan coverage also explains the shift from 
equities to bonds, as the average age of the plan participants increases and the investment 
horizon is shortened. Nevertheless, the potential impact of the new pension accounting 
standards on the volatility of shareholders' equity incrementally explains the cross-sectional 
variation in the shift to equities in both the UK and the US around the adoption of the new 
pension accounting standards.  
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Figure 1 
Mean percentage of pension assets allocated to equity securities and bonds for UK and 
US sponsoring companies during 2001-2007. 
 
 
Figure 1a - UK and US Companies 
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Figure 1b - UK Early Adopters of FRS 17 
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Figure 2 
Pension Asset Allocation around the Adoption of Full Pension Recognition* 
 (FRS 17/ IAS 19 in the UK; SFAS 158 in the US) 
 
Figure 2a: UK
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Figure 2b: US
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Figure 2c: UK Early adopters 
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*Note: The upper figure presents allocation for the entire UK sample. The middle figure 
presents information for the entire US sample. The lower figure presents the pension asset 
allocation for UK early adopters around the adoption of FRS 17. Ay(0) denotes the year of 
adoption. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for UK and US Companies over 2001-2007* 
 
 UK Sample US Sample 
Variable Mean Median STD Mean Median STD 
rEQUITY 0.62 0.64 0.17 0.62 0.64 0.14 
EXPOS1 1.06 0.50 1.42 0.80 0.46 0.92 
EXPOS2 1.23 0.61 1.66 0.89 0.50 1.03 
FUND 0.99 0.99 0.18 0.97 0.95 0.19 
HOR 3.81 3.76 0.51 3.72 3.70 0.46 
LEV 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.27 0.23 0.20 
DIVP 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.11 
TAXR 0.31 0.30 0.11 0.32 0.34 0.10 
SDCF 0.15 0.05 0.24 0.09 0.05 0.11 
SIZE 7.98 7.72 1.26 8.96 8.95 1.52 
CLOSE 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.12 0.00 0.33 
 
*Note: The Table presents variable descriptive statistics for samples of UK (1,509 firm/year 
observations) and US (2,128 firm/year observations) large companies that sponsor defined 
benefit pension plans and for which financial and pension asset allocation data were 
available during the period 2001-2007. Variables are defined as follows: rEQUITY - The 
ratio of pension assets allocated to equity securities over the fair value of total pension assets 
at fiscal year end. EXPOS1 - Fair value of pension assets divided by shareholders’ equity at 
fiscal year end. Shareholders’ equity is adjusted by undoing the recognition of actuarial 
gains/losses and the recognition of net pension surplus/deficit. EXPOS2 - Projected benefit 
obligation (PBO) divided by shareholders’ equity at fiscal year end. Shareholders’ equity is 
adjusted by undoing the recognition of actuarial gains/losses and the recognition of net 
pension surplus/deficit. FUND - Funding ratio, measured as fair value of pension assets 
divided by the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) at fiscal year end. For UK firms, we 
approximate ABO as ABO=PBO/(1+G)N, where G is the assumed salary growth rate and N 
is the pension investment horizon (HOR). HOR - Investment horizon, measured as the 
natural logarithm of the projected benefit obligation (PBO) over current service cost. LEV - 
Financial leverage, measured as long term debt divided by the sum of long term debt and 
market value of equity. DIVP - Dividend payout ratio, measured as dividends per share 
divided by retained earnings per share. If retained earnings are negative, we use the average 
dividends over the current and past two years divided by average retained earnings over the 
current and past two years. TAXR - Effective tax rate, measured as total tax expense over 
pre-tax income. If current pre-tax income is negative, then it is measured as the average tax 
expense over the current and past two years divided by the average pre-tax income over the 
current and past two years. SDCF - The standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary 
items over the preceding 5 years, deflated by the book value of equity at fiscal year end. 
SIZE - The natural logarithm of market value of equity at fiscal year end. CLOSE – “1” if 
the principal defined benefit plan is closed to new entrants, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 2 
Composition of Pension Assets by Country, Year and Portfolio Type* 
 
Asset Category 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
UK Sample         
Observations 144 254 243 249 251 239 232 217 
-Equity 74.4% 66.5% 64.6% 63.1% 62.2% 61.5% 60.0% 54.6%
-Bonds 22.2% 24.5% 26.7% 28.2% 29.7% 31.4% 31.5% 34.9%
-Others 3.4% 9.0% 8.7% 8.7% 8.1% 7.1% 8.5% 10.5%
         
UK Early Adopters         
Observations 21 38 54 54 53 49 47 42
-Equity 70.0% 65.6% 63.3% 62.8% 59.5% 57.3% 54.7% 50.2%
-Bonds 20.8% 28.1% 29.9% 31.1% 32.9% 36.1% 36.7% 37.5%
-Others 9.2% 6.3% 6.8% 6.1% 7.6% 6.6% 8.6% 12.3%
         
US Sample         
Observations 340 308 306 303 304 344 368 338 
-Equity 63.5% 60.8% 60.0% 58.0% 61.1% 64.4% 63.9% 60.8%
-Bonds 29.8% 32.2% 32.1% 30.0% 28.4% 28.6% 28.9% 31.2%
-Others 6.7% 7.0% 7.9% 12.0% 10.5% 7.0% 7.2% 8.0% 
 
*Note: The Table provides information on pension asset allocation of UK and US companies 
based on contemporaneous market values. The samples contain large US and UK companies 
that sponsor defined benefit pension plans for which pension asset allocation data were 
available during 2000-2007. The middle panel contains information on UK early adopters of 
FRS 17. 
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Table 3 
Changes in Asset Allocation Prior to and During the Adoption of Full Recognition* 
 
 Panel A – Asset allocation changes prior to Adoption 
 Obs. Year 
2001 
Pre-Adoption 
Year 
t-test 
2001 vs. Pre-
Adoption 
UK (entire sample)     
%Bond 214 24.5% 29.9% -3.27 (0.00) 
%Equity 214 66.5% 62.2% 2.51 (0.01) 
     
UK Early Adopters     
%Bond 48 28.1% 31.5% -2.42(0.02) 
%Equity 48 65.6% 62.0% 2.59(0.02) 
     
US     
%Bond 252 32.0% 28.0% 5.14 (0.00) 
%Equity 252 60.6% 65.1% -4.92 (0.00) 
 
 Panel B – Asset allocation changes around Adoption 
 
 
Obs. Year 
-1 
Year 
0 
Year 
+1 
t-test 
(-1, +1) 
UK (entire sample)      
%Bond 180 28.9% 31.3% 32.6% -4.08 (0.00) 
%Equity 180 63.3% 61.0% 58.7% 5.95 (0.00) 
      
UK Early Adopters      
%Bond 54 29.8% 33.0% 34.6% -3.66 (0.00) 
%Equity 54 62.9% 59.6% 56.3% 3.65 (0.00) 
      
US      
%Bond 288 28.6% 28.5% 31.1% -4.52 (0.00) 
%Equity 288 64.7% 64.3% 60.8% 7.37 (0.00) 
 
Notes: 
1. Panel A presents percentage of assets allocated to equities and bonds in year 2001 and 
the year prior to the adoption of full pension recognition (FRS 17/ IAS 19 in the UK; 
SFAS 158 in the US). The t-tests (and corresponding p-values) are for the difference 
between allocation in pre-adoption year and allocation in 2001. 
 
2. Panel B presents percentage of assets allocated to equities and bonds around the 
adoption of Full Recognition. Year 0 is the year of adoption of FRS 17/IAS 19 in the UK 
and SFAS 158 in the US. The t-tests (and corresponding p-values) are for the difference 
between allocation in the post-adoption year and allocation in the pre-adoption year. 
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Table 4 
Mean variables around the adoption of Full Pension Recognition 
 
Variables AY 
(-3) 
AY 
(-2) 
AY 
(-1) 
AY 
(0) 
AY 
(+1) 
AY 
(+2) 
t-test 
(-1, +1) 
UK Full Sample      
FUND 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.96 1.14 1.11 3.18 (0.00) 
HOR 3.60 3.67 3.77 3.92 4.00 4.01 3.88 (0.00) 
CLOSE 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.59 0.60 0.60 3.00 (0.00) 
SDCF 0.16 0.16 0.28 0.32 0.21 0.22 -0.98 (0.33) 
LEV  0.23 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22 -2.35 (0.02) 
SIZE 7.77 7.81 7.96 8.06 8.27 8.50 9.76 (0.00) 
UK Early Adopters      
FUND 1.14 1.05 0.97 0.97 0.99 1.03 1.03 (0.31) 
HOR 3.84 3.76 3.83 4.02 4.05 4.09 1.73 (0.09) 
CLOSE 0.21 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.55 1.78 (0.08) 
SDCF 0.21 0.29 0.23 0.45 0.47 0.49 1.42 (0.17) 
LEV  0.16 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.49 (0.63) 
SIZE 8.24 8.19 8.17 8.14 8.29 8.43 0.63 (0.54) 
US Full Sample      
FUND 0.93 0.95 0.95 1.07 1.12 NA 4.71 (0.00) 
HOR 3.74 3.73 3.76 3.81 3.86 NA 1.80 (0.07) 
CLOSE 0.06 0.11 0.24 0.26 0.35 NA 3.14 (0.00) 
SDCF 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.18 NA 0.27 (0.79) 
LEV  0.28 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 NA -1.89 (0.06) 
SIZE 9.03 9.19 9.09 9.24 9.25 NA 5.26 (0.00) 
 
*Note: Mean variables around the adoption of Full Recognition pension accounting. We 
report t-tests (and p-values) of differences between the variable in the post-adoption year 
(AY +1) and the pre-adoption year (AY -1). Variables are defined in Table 1. Data for US 
companies for year AY +2 (Fiscal 2008) is unavailable. 
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Table 5 
Cross Sectional Analysis of Changes in Assets Allocated to Equity Securities in UK 
Companies during the Disclosure of Pension Information under FRS 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1. The Table provides results for estimating Equations (2) for a sample of UK companies 
that sponsor defined benefit pension plans and for which financial and pension asset 
allocation data are available. The dependent variable is rDISCLOSE, which is the change 
in the percentage of assets allocated to equity securities from fiscal 2001until one year 
prior to adoption of FRS 17/IAS 19, rDISCLOSE = rEQUITY (year 2001) - rEQUITY 
(Pre-Adoption year), where rEQUITY is the ratio of pension assets allocated to equity 
securities divided by total pension assets. 
 
2. The model is:  
 
itititititit
itititititit
CLOSESIZESDCFTAXRDIVP
LEVHORFUNDFUNDIMPACTrDISCLOSE
εβββββ
ββββββ
+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+
Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+=
109876
54
2
3210    (2) 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. All independent variables are measured as the 
difference between year -1 and fiscal 2001. 
 
Variable Sign Model 1 Model 2 
ΔEXPOS1 + 0.04  
  (2.09)**  
ΔEXPOS2 +  0.03 
   (1.94)** 
ΔFUND ? 0.18 0.21 
  (1.81)+ (1.65)+ 
ΔFUND2 ? 0.05 0.06 
  (0.64) (0.70) 
ΔHOR - -0.14 -0.13 
  (-2.22)** (-2.09)** 
ΔLEV + 0.26 0.26 
  (9.50)* (9.82)* 
ΔDIVP + 0.04 0.04 
  (0.42) (0.44) 
ΔTAXR + 0.16 0.15 
  (4.31)* (5.12)* 
ΔSDCF + 0.01 0.00 
  (0.06) (0.01) 
ΔSIZE - 0.02 0.02 
  (1.09) (1.08) 
ΔCLOSE + 0.10 0.10 
  (13.87)* (14.20)* 
Constant ? 0.04 0.04 
  (1.36) (1.31) 
Observations  156 156 
Adj. R2  0.19 0.19 
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3. All standard errors were computed using the Petersen (2008) methodology, which 
corrects for within company and over time correlations by clustering. 
 
4. *, **, + indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Cross Sectional Analysis of the Change in Pension Assets Allocated to Equity Securities 
around the Adoption of FRS 17/IAS 19 in the UK and SFAS 158 in the US  
 
 
Notes: 
 
1. The Table provides results for estimating Equation (3) using a sample of UK and US 
companies that sponsor defined benefit pension plans. The dependent variable in this 
table is rADOPT, which is the change in the percentage of assets allocated to equity 
securities from one year prior to adoption until one year after adoption. rADOPT = 
rEQUITY (Pre-Adoption Year) - rEQUITY (Post-Adoption Year), where rEQUITY is the 
ratio of market value of pension assets allocated to equity securities divided by market 
value of total pension assets. 
 
2. The model is: 
  
iiiiiii
iiiiii
rDISCLOSECLOSESIZESDCFTAXRDIVP
LEVHORFUNDFUNDIMPACTrADOPT
ηδδδδδδ
δδδδδδ
++Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+
Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+=
11109876
54
2
3210       (3) 
  UK Sample US Sample 
Variable Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
ΔEXPOS1 + 0.01  0.02  
  (2.60)**  (1.83)+  
ΔEXPOS2 +  0.01  0.01 
   (2.09)**  (2.79)* 
ΔFUND ? -0.76 -0.74 -0.12 -0.14 
  (-2.02)** (-2.47)** (-0.60) (-0.67) 
ΔFUND2 ? 0.30 0.29 0.05 0.06 
  (1.05) (1.05) (0.71) (0.79) 
ΔHOR - -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
  (-0.97) (-0.95) (-1.62) (-1.56) 
ΔLEV + 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.04 
  (1.80)+ (1.77)+ (2.53)** (2.52)** 
ΔDIVP + -0.16 -0.16 0.05 0.06 
  (-0.39) (-0.39) (2.76)** (2.78)* 
ΔTAXR + 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 
  (4.76)* (4.49)* (2.45)** (2.36)** 
ΔSDCF + 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.10 
  (0.13) (0.19) (1.41) (1.22) 
ΔSIZE - 0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.00 
  (1.33) (1.27) (-0.01) (-0.10) 
ΔCLOSE + 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (2.44)** (2.58)** (-0.66) (-0.63) 
rDISCLOSE + 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.04 
  (3.57)* (3.64)* (0.65) (0.71) 
Constant ? 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 
  (1.02) (1.10) (3.18)* (3.09)* 
Observations  137 137 184 184 
Adj. R2  0.18 0.18 0.11 0.11 
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See Table 1 for variable definitions. All independent variables in Equation (3) are 
measured as the difference between the pre-adoption and the post-adoption year. 
 
3. All standard errors were computed using the Petersen (2008) methodology, which 
corrects for within company and over time correlations by clustering. 
 
4. *, **, + indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
